I reached the same conclusion as Hösle (see quote below) and believe it’s what makes Wittgenstein’s pragmatism compatible with Marxist materialist accounts of meaning, particularly if one believes that Wittgenstein’s “meaning-use” isn’t anything-goes pragmatism but a pragmatics rooted in inferentialism between rational subjects in reciprocal recognition.
As I’ve held, once one allows for “family resemblance” then one must also accept that there’s a naturalism at work in Wittgenstein’s pragmatism: “The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.” And then one merely defines Wittgenstein’s naturalism in materialist terms: epistemic reification and some degree of stasis such as the encyclopedia entry, dictionary definition, school lesson, knowledge work, and so on.
Simply put, the inferential moments bearing normativity are dialectical (involve contradictions) lest there be no change in language and meaning:
“Hösle argues that Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell ignore the dialectical features of Hegel’s thought, thus depriving themselves of possible resources for overcoming the contingency and relativism that threatens their anti-empiricist account of concepts.”
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-dimensions-of-hegel-s-dialectic/
STEVEN WEXLER 