A few more thoughts on Floridi’s brilliant work, The Philosophy of Information (PoI) (2011):

WIENER: “[Information is] a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as we adjust to it, and make our adjustment felt upon it” (91).

WHEELER: “Wheeler appears to endorse an information-theoretic, metaphysical monism: the universe’s essential nature is digital, being fundamentally composed of information as data/dedomena instead of matter or energy, with material objects as a complex secondary manifestation” (91).

It’s difficult to see how Ontological Neutrality “ON” (no information without data representations)** isn’t material, matter-energy (90). Isn’t the suggestion that it could be something other than matter-energy a Platonism or metaphysics? This critique then begs the question: 

Can information represent its own ontological category even if information is always already material, e.g., matter-energy? What would make this category distinct?

**See for example 1.6 Ontological neutrality

Addendum:RE FI.9 “Informing does not require truth.”

A dog’s bark is information.
A dog’s bark is neither true nor false
Therefore informing does not require truth.

An aesthetic opinion is information, e.g., “This painting is beautiful.”
An aesthetic opinion is neither true nor false
Therefore informing does not require truth.