In her discussion of Chilean neurophysiologist Humberto Maturana’s
closed, “autopoietic” model of self, N. Katherine Hayles considers an
onto-epistemology grounded in species-specific geneticism (and even further variated by allelic arrangements). Maturana’s autopoiesis presents a looping
mechanism where the individual’s “structure-determined system” (140)
manifests a “circular, self-reflexive dynamic”; that is, the
individual’s organizational system produces the very stuff, e.g., nucleic
acids, that in turn produces the organizational system (136). What this means epistemologically is that
the individual does not so much “register reality as [s/he] does construct
it” (135), e.g., the eye communicates to the brain not by a
“transmission of an accurate copy of light,” but rather through a
“language already highly organized and interpreted” by structure
(135). Whatever “reality” is, it comes to us only “through
interactive processes determined solely by the organism’s own
organization” (136). Such recursive onto-epistemology may appear to be another version of liberal humanism. Maturana’s autonomous individual, however, is still “structurally coupled to the phenomenon she sees”
(142). As Hayles explains:
Autonomy as Maturana envisions it is not consistent with laissez-faire
capitalism; it is not consistent that each person is out for himself and devil
take the hindmost; and it is not consistent with the ethical position that a
scientist could undertake a research program without being concerned about how
the results of the research would be used. In these respects, the individualism
and autonomy that Maturana champions challenge the premises embodied in liberal
subjectivity at least as much as they
reinscribe those premises. (143)
In this sense, “[s]elf-consciousness arises when the
observer ‘through orienting [linguistic] behavior can orient himself toward
himself, and then generate communicative descriptions that orient him toward
his description of this self-organization’” (144). This recursive reflexivity is grounded in positionality not personality since in “autopoietic theory, the opposite of objectivism is not subjectivism but relativism”:
Maturana’s observer is more like the observer that Albert Einstein
posits in the special theory of relativity. The one who sees is always called simply “the observer,”
without further specification, implying that any individual of that species
occupying that position would see more or less the same thing. (143)
Consciousness becomes an “epiphenomenon rather than a defining characteristic of the human as an autopoietic entity” (145).
