Doesn’t physics reduce being to information and ontology to epistemology?

Yes, but only if there is a perceiving agent!

Is “this” then tautology or autopoiesis?
 

SUSAN: Everybody puts on an act.
SANDY: So even if you meet somebody, you don’t know who you’re meeting.
SUSAN: Because you’re meeting the act.
SANDY: That’s right. Not the person.
SUSAN: I’m not sure I agree.
SANDY: With what?
SUSAN: With what you said. 
SANDY: No, I don’t either.  
SUSAN: You don’t agree with what you said? 
SANDY: How do you feel about it?  
SUSAN: I think people only like to think they’re putting on an act, but it’s not an act—it’s really them. If they think it’s an act they feel better because they think they can always change it. 
SANDY: You mean they’re kidding themselves because it’s not really an act? 
SUSAN: Yes, it is an act, but they’re the act—the act is them. 
SANDY: But if it’s them then how can it be an act?  
SUSAN: Because they’re an act. 
SANDY: But they’re also real.  
SUSAN: No.
SANDY: You mean I’m not real? 
SUSAN: No. 
SANDY: I’m an act? 
SUSAN: It’s all right. I’m an act, too.

“For Kant, however, the public space of ‘world-civil society’ designates the paradox of the universal singularity, of a singular subject who, in a kind of short-circuit, by-passing the mediation of the particular, directly participates in the universal.  This is what Kant, in the famous passage of his ‘What is Enlightenment?’ means by ‘public’ as opposed to ‘private.’ ‘Private’ is not one’s individual as opposed to communal ties, but the very communal-institutional order of one’s particular identification; while ‘public’ is the transnational universality of the exercise of one’s reason. The paradox of the underlying formula ‘think freely, but obey!’ (which, of course, poses a series of problems of its own, since it also relies on the distinction between the ‘performative’ level of social authority and the level of free-thinking where performativity is suspended) is thus that one participates in the universal dimension of the ‘public’ sphere precisely as a singular individual extracted from or even opposed to one’s substantial communal identification—one is truly universal only when radically singular, in the interstices of communal identities. It is Kant who should be read here as the critic of Rorty. In his vision of the public space of the unconstrained free exercise of reason, he asserts the dimension of emancipatory universality outside the confines of (social) being. This is the dimension missing in Rorty” (Zizek, Violence 144).