Free Unfreedom!

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“We are here at the very nerve-centre of liberal ideology: freedom of choice, grounded in the notion of the ‘psychological’ subject, endowed with propensities which he or she strives to realize. And this especially holds today, in the era of a ‘risk society’ in which the ruling ideology endeavours to sell us the very insecurities caused by the dismantling of the welfare state as the opportunity for new freedoms. If labour flexibilization means you have to change jobs every year, why not see it as a liberation from the constraints of a permanent career, a chance to reinvent yourself and realize the hidden potential of your personality? If there is a shortfall on your standard health insurance and retirement plan, meaning you have to opt for extra coverage, why not perceive it as an additional opportunity to choose: either a better lifestyle now or long-term security? Should this predicament cause you anxiety, the ‘second modernity’ ideologist will diagnose you as desiring to ‘escape from freedom’, of an immature sticking to old stable forms. Even better, when this is inscribed into the ideology of the subject as the ‘psychological’ individual, pregnant with natural abilities, you will automatically tend to interpret all these changes as the outcome of your personality, not as the result of being thrown around by market forces.”

–Slavoj Žižek, “Against Human Rights

A Few Thoughts on Writing Instruction

1. It is misleading to argue for the efficacy of one medium-based composition over another through issues of “transferability” (i.e., the transfer of “successfully” learned rhetorical strategies used in one medium {e.g., print} to another {e.g., blog}). While discussions of “transferability" in a general sense may bring a better understanding of the nature of writing, one will not make a better case for using one medium over another by pointing to transferability. Consider the following claim:
    
a does for p what b does not 

or
a → p ∧ b ¬ p
   
      where ‘a’ is print composition, ‘p’ is argument, and ‘b’ is digital composition.
  

The problem arises when one considers that ‘p’ is always-already intricately part of its medium, so that the rhetorical moves that comprise ‘a’ (and give ‘p’), e.g., ‘a’1 (audience awareness), ‘a’2 (tone), and ‘a’3 (references), and so on cannot be separated from the medium in terms of assessing its rhetorical effect, ‘p.’
  
So except for a general understanding of meaning that might come from a discussion of the limits of such a comparison, it makes little sense to look for what a student has “learned” when composing with one medium by searching for similar moves employed with another medium, i.e., as far as these moves can say anything definitive about ‘p’ apart from its specific medium. 
 
While much can be said of studies that support such claims, e.g., sample size, background or preparedness in digital theory and multimodal composition, these latter concerns are beside the point. The study’s method is irrelevant when the concepts the study rests on are erroneous
   
2. That said, digital composition is a helpful heuristic or pedagogical strategy for gaining rhetorical understanding. I would, in fact, suggest that digital composition is more helpful than print given the former’s Web-immediacy to a variety of texts, authors, genres, and composing methods—all of which could better bring “metacognitive" awareness to writing students. This is one reason why the digital should be incorporated into First Year Composition (FYC), limited time and all. This latter observation brings me to two more concerns.
  
3. FYC must be seen as an early (introductory) course in the discipline of Rhetoric and Composition and not as a service course for the university. While some rhetorical understanding gained in a one- or two-semester FYC course can transfer to other disciplines (contra Wardle et al.’s assertion that it cannot), there is no monolithic university writing, no monolithic History 300, and no monolithic Professor X who sees effective writing in the same way as other instructors—that is, as other history professors or as FYC writing instructors. That is to say, such an understanding of FYC as a service course ignores the pragmatic, contextual nature of writing, of meaning. Therefore “Approaches to University Writing” is a misleading and poor choice for a course title. One cannot “teach” students how to write, and one cannot provide comprehensive metacognitive awareness in one or two semesters. How are faculty in other disciplines going to recognize these limits if R/C faculty don’t: “Why aren’t you teaching these kids how to write a sentence!?”
  
4. Professionalization. We continue to hear that FYC classes and instructors have a responsibility to their students to prepare them for “real world” employment. While this concern is no doubt heartfelt and practical, it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of writing, meaning, communication, and the student’s role in the ostensible job market. This objection can be clarified with two points:
  
A. Just as there is no monolithic university course one can teach to, there is no monolithic workplace—job—for which a FYC instructor can possibly prepare a student. Will a FYC course enable students to gain and hold employment in a hospital, film studio, zoo, chemical plant, fashion industry, high school, recording studio, pharmaceutical company, law firm, ad agency, construction site, and/or dance school?  Is it fair and reasonable to suggest FYC couldWriting is not a “skill” to be taught
     
     
B. It is precisely the futility in professionalization due to the pragmatic nature of meaning and heterogeneity of work that FYC must involve various genres of writing and media. This point “B” could easily be its own heading since we’re really talking about writing complexity (writing-rhetoric-medium-meaning) that will not come from a skills-based “Writing about Writing” approach, that is, not a course that ignores culture, biography, politics, economics, and so on since all of the above are part of composing. I would go as far as to suggest that Wardle et al. fail to recognize that their instrumentalism is a condition of our socioeconomic moment—“Writing about Writing” and writing professionalization are not only reductionist, they are part of the problem. They are precisely why students can’t write that sentence for Professor X.
 
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On Rules

“And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.”

—Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

Collective Intentions or Inferential Reciprocity?

Searle’s social ontology suggests that one can make an epistemically objective claim from a domain that is ontologically subjective, an ontology that would seem to give, among other things, an empirical dimension to Freudian science after Wittgenstein’s demotion/promotion of that science to myth (Wittgenstein arguably does this, too, with the demotion/promotion). Yet at the same time Searle’s “collective intentionality” as repeated representations via logical form of declarations puts the mirror back into the progressive sociality of meaning suggested by Brandom’s and Sellars’s rational pragmatism—the Hegelian “interpersonal inferential commitments” (42) that not only rescues rationality from liberalist epistemology, as Searle’s does with the idea of a collective epistemic, but locates the normative in a conceptual contentfulness “socially instituted through mutual recognition” (Macbeth 198), i.e., without “taking representation as its fundamental concept” (Brandom 28). Though Brandom notes that such “methodological commitment” still acknowledges an “important representational dimension to concept use” (28).

Brandom, Robert B. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000.

Macbeth, Danielle. “Inference, Meaning, and Truth in Brandom, Sellars, and Frege.” Reading Brandom: On Making It Explicit. Ed. Bernhard Weiss and Jeremy Wanderer. London: Routledge, 2010. 

http://youtu.be/PESRS1EXfQA